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Abstract
An adversary who has obtained the cryptographic hash of a user’s password can mount an offline
attack to crack the password by comparing this hash value with the cryptographic hashes of likely
password guesses. This offline attacker is limited only by the resources he is willing to invest to crack
the password. Key-stretching techniques like hash iteration and memory hard functions have been
proposed to mitigate the threat of offline attacks by making each password guess more expensive for
the adversary to verify. However, these techniques also increase costs for a legitimate authentication
server. We introduce a novel Stackelberg game model which captures the essential elements of this
interaction between a defender and an offline attacker. In the game the defender first commits to
a key-stretching mechanism, and the offline attacker responds in a manner that optimizes his utility
(expected reward minus expected guessing costs). We then introduce Cost Asymmetric Secure Hash
(CASH), a randomized key-stretching mechanism that minimizes the fraction of passwords that would be
cracked by a rational offline attacker without increasing amortized authentication costs for the legitimate
authentication server. CASH is motivated by the observation that the legitimate authentication server
will typically run the authentication procedure to verify a correct password, while an offline adversary will
typically use incorrect password guesses. By using randomization we can ensure that the amortized cost
of running CASH to verify a correct password guess is significantly smaller than the cost of rejecting an
incorrect password. Using our Stackelberg game framework we can quantify the quality of the underlying
CASH running time distribution in terms of the fraction of passwords that a rational offline adversary
would crack. We provide an efficient algorithm to compute high quality CASH distributions for the
defender. Finally, we analyze CASH using empirical data from two large scale password frequency
datasets. Our analysis shows that CASH can significantly reduce (up to 50%) the fraction of password
cracked by a rational offline adversary.
1 Introduction
In recent years the authentication servers at major companies like eBay, Zappos, Sony, LinkedIn and
Adobe [3–8] have been breached. These breaches have resulted in the release of the cryptographic hashes of
millions of user passwords, each of which has significant economic value to adversaries [36,60]. An adversary
who has obtained the cryptographic hash of a user’s password can mount a fully automated attack to crack
the user’s password by comparing this hash value to the cryptographic hashes of likely password guesses [31].
This offline attacker can try as many password guesses as he likes; he is only limited by the resources that
he is willing to invest to crack the password.
Offline attacks are becoming increasingly dangerous due to a combination of several different factors.
First, improvements in computing hardware make password cracking cheaper (e.g., [60]). Second, empirical
data indicates that many users tend to select low entropy passwords [20, 32, 56]. Finally, offline adversaries
now have a wealth of training data available from previous password breaches [37] so the adversary often
has very accurate background knowledge about the structure of popular passwords.
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Password hash functions like PBKDF2 [43], BCRYPT [54], Argon2 [12] and SCRYPT [51] employ key-
stretching [48] to make it more expensive for an offline adversary to crack a hashed password. While
key-stretching may reduce the number of password guesses that the adversary is able to try, the legiti-
mate authentication server faces a basic trade-off: he must also pay an increased cost every time a user
authenticates.
The basic observation behind our work is that it is possible for the legitimate authentication server to
use randomization to gain an advantage in this cat-and-mouse game. The offline adversary will spend most
of his time guessing incorrect passwords, while the authentication server will primarily authenticate users
with correct passwords. Therefore, it would be desirable to have an authentication procedure whose cost
is asymmetric. That is the cost of rejecting an incorrect password is greater than the cost of accepting a
correct password. This same basic observation lay behind Manber’s proposal to use secret salt values (e.g.,
“pepper”) [46]. For example, the server might store the cryptographic hash H(pwd, t) for a uniformly random
value t ∈ {1, . . . ,m} called the “pepper”. An offline adversary will need to compute the hash function m
times in total to reject an incorrect password pwd′, while the legitimate authentication server will only need
to compute it m+12 times on average to accept a correct password.
We introduce Cost Asymmetric Secure Hash (CASH) a mechanism for protecting passwords against offline
attacks while minimizing expected costs to the legitimate authentication server. CASH may be viewed as
a simple, yet powerful, extension of [46] in which the distribution over t is not-necessarily uniform — the
“peppering” idea of Manber [46] is a special case of our mechanism in which the distribution over t is uniform.
In this paper we seek to address the following questions: How can we quantify the security gains (losses)
from the use of secret salt values? What distribution over the secret salt value (t) is optimal for the
authentication server? Is there an efficient algorithm to compute this distribution? Does CASH perform
better than “pepper” or deterministic key stretching?
Contributions We first introduce a Stackelberg (leader-follower) game which captures the essential aspects
of our password setting. Our Stackelberg model can provide helpful guidance for the authentication server
by predicting whether or not (a particular level of) key-stretching will significantly reduce the number of
passwords that would be cracked by a rational offline adversary in the event of a server breach. In our
Stackelberg game the authentication server (leader) first commits to a password hashing strategy, and the
offline adversary (follower) gets to play his best response to the server’s (leader’s) action. That is the
adversary selects a threshold B and begins guessing passwords until he either 1) cracks the user’s password,
or 2) gives up after expending B units of work. The adversary will select a threshold B that maximizes his
utility.1
Next we give an efficient algorithm for computing good strategies for the leader (authentication server) in
this Stackelberg game. The defender wants to find a distribution p˜1 ≥ . . . ≥ p˜m ≥ 0 over the secret running
time parameter t ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, which minimizes the number of passwords that an offline adversary would
crack. When choosing this distribution, the defender is given a constraint (e.g., E[t] =
∑m
t=1 t · p˜t ≤ Cmax)
bounding the server’s amortized authentication costs.
Unfortunately, there are no known polynomial time algorithms to compute the Stackelberg equilibrium of
our game as this problem reduces to a non-convex optimization problem.2 However, we develop an efficient
algorithm to solve a closely related goal: find the CASH distribution which minimizes the success rate of an
adversary with a fixed budget B per user. While this new goal is not equivalent to the Stackelberg equilibrium
our experimental results indicate that the resulting CASH distributions translate to good strategies in
the original Stackelberg game. At a technical level we show that this new optimization problem can be
expressed as a linear program. The key technical challenge in solving this linear program is that it has
exponentially many constraints. Fortunately, this linear program can still be solved in polynomial time
using an efficient separation oracle that we develop. We also develop a practical algorithm which can quickly
1Intuitively, the adversary’s utility is his expected reward (the value of a cracked password times the probability he cracks
it) minus his expected guessing costs (given by the expected number of times that the adversary needs to evaluate the hash
function before he succeeds or gives up).
2By contrast, fixing any CASH distribution p˜i ≥ . . . ≥ p˜m it is easy to compute the adversary’s best response.
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find the (approximately) optimal CASH distribution against a budget B adversary. The algorithm is efficient
enough to run on large real world instances (e.g., a dataset of 70 million passwords).
Finally, we evaluated CASH using password frequency data from the RockYou password breach and from
a (perturbed) dataset of 70 million Yahoo! passwords [16, 20]. Our analysis shows that CASH significantly
outperforms the traditional (deterministic) key-stretching defense as well as the “peppering” defense of [46].
In some instances, CASH reduced the fraction of passwords cracked by a rational adversary by about 50%
in comparison to both pepper and traditional key-stretching algorithms.
2 Background
Before we introduce the basic CASH mechanism it is necessary to introduce some notation (Section 2.1) and
review the traditional password based authentication process (Section 2.2).
2.1 Notation.
We use H to denote a cryptographic hash function and we let Cost (H) denote the cost of evaluating H one
time. To simplify the presentation we will assume that all other costs have been scaled so that Cost (H) = 1.
We use Hk to denote a hash function that is k-times as expensive to compute.3 We use P to denote the
space of passwords that users may select, and we use n to denote the number of passwords in this space.
We use pi to denote the probability that a random user selects the password pwdi ∈ P. For notational
convenience, we assume that the passwords have been sorted so that p1 ≥ ... ≥ pn. Given a set S we will
write x
$← S to denote a uniformly random sample from the set S.
Table 1 contains a summary of the notation used throughout this paper. Some of this notation will be
introduced later in the paper when it is first used.
2.2 Traditional Password Authentication.
We begin by giving a brief overview of the traditional password authentication process. Suppose that a user
registers for an account with username u and password pwdu ∈ P. Typically, an authentication server will
store a record like the following
(
u, su, k,H
k (pwdu, su)
)
. Here, su
$← {0, 1}L is a random L-bit salt [9] value
used to prevent rainbow table attacks [49] and the parameter k controls the cost of the hash function. We
stress that the salt value su and the cost parameter k are stored on the server in the clear so an adversary who
breaches the authentication server will learn both of these values. We use the notation su to emphasize that
this salt value is different for each user u. The parameter k is selected subject to the constraint that k ≤ Cmax
— the maximum amortized cost that the authentication server is willing to incur for authentication.4
When the user authenticates he will type in his username u and a password guess pwd′u ∈ P. The
authentication server first finds the record
(
u, su, k,H
k (pwdu, su)
)
. It then computes Hk (pwd′u, su) and
verifies that it matches the stored hash value Hk (pwdu, su). Note that authentication will always be suc-
cessful when the user’s password is correct (e.g., pwd′u = pwdu) because the hash values H
k (pwd′u, su) and
Hk (pwdu, su) must match in this case. Similarly, if the user’s password is incorrect (e.g., pwdu 6= pwd′u) then
3In this work we will not focus on the lower level issue of which key-stretching techniques are used. However, this is an
important research area [1] and we would strongly advocate for the use of modern key-stretching techniques like memory hard
functions. BCRYPT [54] and PBKDF2 [43], use hash iteration for key-stretching. In this case the cost parameter k specifies
the number of hash iterations. For example, if k = 2 the authentication server would store the tuple
(
k = 2,H
(
H(pwd)
))
. The
disadvantage to this approach is that a hash function H might cost orders of magnitude less to evaluate on an Application
Specific Integrated Circuit than it would cost to evaluate on a more traditional architecture. By contrast, memory costs
tend to be relatively stable across different architectures [33], which motivates the use of memory hard functions for password
hashing [50]. Argon2 [12], winner of the recently completed password hashing competition [1], and SCRYPT [51] use memory
hard functions to perform key-stretching. In this paper we will simply use Hk is k-times as expensive to compute without
worrying about the specific key-stretching techniques that were employed to achieve this property.
4In the traditional (deterministic) key-stretching setting it is clear the hash cost parameter k = Cmax is equivalent to the
maximum authentication cost parameter Cmax. However, this equivalence will not hold one we introduce a randomized running
time parameter t. Thus, it is helpful to use separate notation to separate these distinct parameters.
3
authentication will fail with high probability because the cryptographic hash function H is collision resistant.
Server Cost. Under this traditional password mechanism the cost of verifying/rejecting a password is
simply k. The authentication server can increase guessing costs for an offline adversary by increasing k, but
in doing so the authentication server will increase its own authentication costs proportionally.
Authentication Time Increase. By increasing the cost parameter k the authentication server might
potentially increase delay times for the user — especially if key-stretching is performed on a sequential
computer. Bonneau and Schechter [22] estimated that Cost (H) ≈ $7×10−15 for the SHA-256 hash function
based on observations of the Bitcoin network. A modern CPU can evaluate SHA-256 around 107 times per
second so an authentication server who uses hash iteration for key-stretching would need to select k ≤ 107 if
he wants to ensure that user delay is at most one second. In this case we would seem to have an upperbound
Cost
(
Hk
) ≤ $7 × 10−8 on the cost of a hash function that can be evaluated in 1 second. Fortunately,
this bound only applies to naive hash iteration5. More effective key-stretching techniques could be used
to increase Cost
(
Hk
)
by several orders of magnitude (e.g., Cost
(
Hk
) ≥ $10−5) without imposing longer
authentication delays on the user (even if key-stretching is performed on a sequential computer). For example,
the SCRYPT [51] and Argon2 [12] hash functions were intentionally designed to use a larger amount of
memory so that it is not possible to (significantly) reduce hashing costs by developing customized hardware.
Additionally, Argon2 [12], winner of the password hashing competition, has an optional parameter that
would allow the authentication server to exploit parallelism to further reduce the amount of time necessary
to perform key-stretching.
2.3 Adversary Model
We consider an untargeted offline attacker whose goal is to break as many passwords as possible. An offline
attacker has breached the authentication server and has access to all of the data stored on the server.
In the traditional authentication setting an offline adversary learns the tuple
(
u, su, k,H
k (pwdu, su)
)
for
each user u. The adversary will also learn the hash function H since the code to compute H is present
on the authentication server. We assume that the adversary only uses H in a blackbox manner (e.g., the
adversary can query H as a random oracle, but he cannot invert H). In general we assume the adversary
will obtain the source code for any other procedures that are used during the authentication process. While
the authentication server can limit the number of guesses that an online adversary can make (e.g., by locking
the adversary out after three incorrect guesses), the authentication server cannot directly limit the number
of guesses that an offline attacker can try. An offline attacker is limited only by the resources that s/he is
willing to invest trying to crack the user’s password.
We assume that the adversary has a value vu for cracking user u’s password. An untargeted offline
attacker has the same value vu = v for every user u. Symantec recently reported that passwords sell for
between $4 and $30 on the black market [36] so we might reasonably estimate that v ∈ [$4, $30].6
We also assume that the adversary knows the empirical password distribution p1 ≥ ... ≥ pn over user
selected passwords as well as the corresponding passwords pwd1, . . . , pwdn. Thus, the adversary knows that
a random user will select pwd1 with probability p1, but the adversary does not know which users selected
pwd1.
The adversary will select a threshold B and check (up to) B passwords. In this case the fraction of
passwords that the offline adversary will break is at most
∑B
i=1 pi. Equality holds when the offline adversary
adopts his optimal guessing strategy and checks the B most likely passwords pwd1, . . . , pwdB . In this case
5As we previously noted hash iteration alone is not a particularly effective key-stretching technique. The cost of computing
SHA-256 can be reduced by a factor of about 1 million on customize hardware — e.g., see https://bitcoinmagazine.liberty.
me/bitmain-announces-launch-of-next-generation-antminer-s7-bitcoin-miner/ (Retrieved 5/4/2016). Furthermore, we
note that modern Bitcoin miners already use Application Specific Integrated Circuits to compute SHA-256 so the upper bound
from [22] implicitly incorporates this dramatic cost reduction. By contrast, the adversary cannot (significantly) reduce the cost
of evaluating a memory hard function by developing customized hardware.
6However, this estimate of the adversary’s value could be too high because it does not account for the inherent risk of getting
caught when selling/using the password
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the adversary’s utility would be
UdetADV (B, v, k)
.
= v
B∑
i=1
pi −
(
k
B∑
i=1
i · pi +
n∑
i=B+1
B · pi
)
.
The first term is the adversary’s expected reward. The last term is the adversary’s expected guessing cost.7
Let B∗ = Bdet,∗v = arg maxB U
det
ADV (B, v, k) denote the adversary’s utility optimizing strategy. Then the
fraction of passwords cracked by a rational adversary will be
PdetADV,v,k .=
B∗∑
i=1
pi . (1)
3 CASH Mechanism
In this section we introduce the basic CASH mechanism, while deferring until later the question of how to
optimize the parameters of the mechanism.
3.1 CASH Authentication.
Observe that in traditional password authentication the costs of verifying and rejecting a password guess
are symmetric. The goal of CASH is to redesign the authentication mechanism so that these costs are not
symmetric. In particular, we want to ensure that the cost of rejecting an incorrect password is greater
than the cost of accepting a correct password. This is a desirable property because most of the adversary’s
password guesses during an offline attack will be incorrect. By contrast, the authentication server will spend
most of its effort authenticating legitimate users.
3.1.1 Creating an Account
Suppose that a user u registers for an account with the password pwdu ∈ P. In CASH authentication the
authentication server stores the value
(
u, su, k,H
k (pwdu, su, tu)
)
. As before su is a random salt value and
k is the number of hash iterations. The key difference is that we select a random value tu from the range
{1, . . . ,m}. We stress that the value tu is not stored on the authentication server (unlike the salt value
su). Thus, the value tu will not be available to an adversary who breaches the server. The account creation
process is formally presented in Algorithm 1. We use the notation tu here to emphasize that this value is
chosen independently for each user u. Intuitively, the parameter tu specifies the number of times that the
authentication server needs to compute Hk when verifying a correct password guess using CASH.
3.1.2 Authentication
When the user u tries to authenticate using the password guess pwd′u the authentication server first locates
the record
(
u, su, k,H
k (pwdu, su, tu)
)
. The authentication server then computes Hk (pwd′u, su, t) for each
value t ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. Authentication is successful if the hashes match for any value t ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. This
is guaranteed to happen after tu steps whenever the user’s password is correct (pwd
′
u = pwdu), and this is
highly unlikely whenever the user’s password is incorrect. The authentication process is formally presented
in Algorithm 2.
7Note that for i ≤ B the adversary finishes early after only i guesses if and only if the user selected password pwdi (probability
pi). If the user selected password pwdi with i > B then the adversary will quit after B guesses.
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Table 1: Notation
Term Explanation
P space of passwords
n number of passwords in P
pwdi the i’th most likely password in P
pi probability that a random user selects pwdi
m the number of evaluations of Hk necessary to reject an incorrect pass-
word using CASH
t ∈ {1, . . . ,m} hidden running time parameter which specifies the running time of
CASH when verifying an correct password. t is randomly selected during
account creation.
p˜ a distribution over the hidden running time parameter t
p˜j the probability that the running time parameter is t = j
pii the probability of the i’th most likely tuple (pwd, t)
α probability of seeing a correct password in a random authentication
session
H a cryptographic hash function with Cost (H) = 1
Hk a cryptographic hash function with Cost
(
Hk
)
= k
CSRV,α mk(1−α)+αk
∑m
t=1 t·p˜t, the amortized cost of a random authentication
session.
Cmax the maximum (amortized) cost that the authentication server is willing
to incur per authentication
v adversary’s true value for a cracked password
vˆ the authentication server’s estimate for v
PCASHADV,v,vˆ,C
the fraction of passwords cracked by a rational value v adversary, when
the authentication server optimizes the CASH distribution p˜ under the
belief vˆ subject to the cost constraint CSRV,α ≤ Cmax.
PpepperADV,v,C
the fraction of passwords cracked by a rational value v adversary, when
the authentication server uses the uniform distribution p˜i = 1/m. The
hash cost parameter k is now tuned subject to the cost constraint
CSRV,α ≤ C.
PdetADV,v,C
the fraction of passwords cracked by a rational value v adversary when
the authentication server uses deterministic key-stretching techniques.
The hash cost parameter is set to k = C so that the servers cost is C
for each authentication session.
3.1.3 CASH Notation
We use p˜i to denote the probability that we set tu = i during the account creation process. For notational
convenience we will assume that these values are sorted so that p˜1 ≥ . . . ≥ p˜m. We will use t← p˜ to denote a
random sample from {1, . . . ,m} in which Prt←p˜ [t = i] = p˜i. For now we assume that the CASH distribution
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p˜ is given to us. In later sections we will discuss how to select a good distribution p˜.
Algorithm 1 CASH: Create Account
Input: u, pwdu, p˜ = (p˜1, . . . , p˜m), k, L
1: su
$← {0, 1}L
2: tu ← p˜
3: h← Hk (pwdu, su, tu)
4: StoreRecord (u, su, k, h)
Algorithm 2 CASH:Authenticate
Input: u, pwdu
1: R← TryFindRecord (u)
2: if R = ∅ then
3: return “Username Not Found.”
4: end if
5: (u, su, k, h)← R
6: for t = 1, . . . ,m do
7: ht ← Hk (pwdu, su, t)
8: if ht = h then
9: return “Authentication Successful”
10: end if
11: end for
12: return “Authentication Failed”
3.2 Cost to Server
The cost of rejecting an incorrect password guess is m · k because the server must evaluate Hk (pwdu, su, tu)
for all m possible values of tu ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. However, whenever a password guess is correct the authentication
server can halt computation as soon as it finds a match, which will happen after tu iterations. Here, we
assume that the authentication server will minimize its amortized cost by trying the most likely values of
tu first. If we let α denote the probability that the user enters his password correctly during a random
authentication session then the amortized cost of the authentication server is
CSRV,α
.
= (1− α) k ·m+ α · k
m∑
i=1
i · p˜i .
In general, we will assume that the server has a maximum amortized cost Cmax that it is willing to incur for
authentication.8 Thus, the authentication server must pick the distribution p˜ subject to the cost constraint
CSRV,α ≤ Cmax.
3.3 Adversary Response
Fixing the CASH distribution p˜ induces a distribution over pairs (pwd, t) ∈ P×{1, . . . ,m}, namely Pr[(pwd, t)] =
pi · p˜t. Once the adversary selects a threshold B the adversary’s optimal strategy is to try the B most likely
pairs. In this case the adversary’s utility will be
UCASHADV (B, v) = v
B∑
i=1
pii − k
B∑
i=1
i · pii − k
mn∑
i=B+1
B · pii , (2)
8For example, Cmax might be (approximately) given by the maximum computational load that the authentication server(s)
can handle divided by the maximum (anticipated) number of users authenticating at any given point in time.
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where the terms pi1 ≥ . . . ≥ pimn denote the probabilities of each pair (pwd, t) ∈ P × {1, . . . ,m} (in sorted
order). In general, the distribution p˜ that the authentication server selects may depend on the maximum
(amortized) server cost Cmax as well as our belief vˆ about the adversary’s value for a cracked password.
Once vˆ and Cmax (and thus p˜1, . . . , p˜m, k and pi1, . . . , pimn) have been fixed we can let B
∗ = BCASH,∗v =
arg maxB U
CASH
ADV (B, v) denote the adversary’s utility optimizing response. Then the fraction of passwords
cracked by a rational adversary will be
PCASHADV,v,vˆ,Cmax
.
=
B∗∑
i=1
pii . (3)
Similarly, we will use PpepperADV,v,Cmax to denote the fraction of passwords cracked by a rational adversary when p˜
is the uniform distribution.9 In this case the hash cost parameter k is tuned to to ensure that CSRV,α ≤ Cmax
— this can be achieved when
k =
Cmax
(1− α)m+ α (m+12 ) . (4)
3.3.1 Example Distribution
One simple, yet elegant, way to achieve the goal of cost asymmetry is to set p˜j =
1
m for each j ∈{1, . . . ,m} [46]. We will sometimes call this solution uniform-CASH in this paper because it is a special case
of the CASH mechanism. The amortized cost of verifying a correct password guess with uniform-CASH is
CSRV,1 = k
(
m+1
2
)
. By contrast, the cost of rejecting an incorrect password guess is k ·m — approximately
twice the cost of verifying a correct password guess.
Examples with Analysis The above mechanism can already be used to significantly reduce the fraction
of user passwords that would be cracked in an offline attack. We demonstrate the potential power of CASH
with two (simplistic) examples. To keep the examples simple we will assume that that users never forget
or mistype their passwords (i.e., α = 1). In the first example, every user selects one of two passwords
(e.g., pwd1 =“123456” and pwd2=“iloveyou”) with probability p1 = 2/3 and p2 = 1/3 respectively, and the
untargeted adversary has a value of v = 43Cmax + , just slightly more than Cmax — the amortized cost
incurred by the authentication server during an authentication session.
• (Deterministic Key-Stretching) The defender sets the hash cost parameter k = Cmax and stores the
deterministic hash value Hk. It is easy to check that the adversary’s optimal response is to choose
the maximum threshold B∗ = 2. In this case the adversary cracks the password with probability
PdetADV,v,Cmax = 1.
• (Uniform CASH) The defender sets p˜i = 1m for each i and he selects cost parameter k = 2·Cmax/(m+1)
to ensure that CSRV,1 ≤ Cmax — see eq 4 . It is not too difficult to see that the adversary’s optimal
response is to choose the threshold B∗ = 0 (i.e., give up without guessing).10 Thus, PpepperADV,v,Cmax =
0 < 1 = PdetADV,v,Cmax .
This first example illustrates the potential advantage of randomization. The next example illustrates
the potential advantage of non-uniform distributions. Example 2 is the same as example 1 except that we
increase the adversary’s value to v = 53Cmax.
• (Deterministic Key-Stretching) Increasing v can only increase PdetADV,v,Cmax . Thus, PdetADV,v,Cmax = 1.
• (Uniform CASH) Now the adversary’s optimal strategy is to choose the maximum threshold B∗ = 2m
(i.e., keep guessing until he finds the password). Thus, PpepperADV,v,Cmax = 1.
9Note that PpepperADV,v,Cmax does not depend on vˆ, our belief about the adversary’s value, because the choice of p˜ (and k) is
independent of this belief.
10In particular, if the adversary instead sets B∗ = 2m (i.e., keep guessing until he succeeds) then his expected guessing costs
will be p1k
(
m+1
2
)
+ (1− p1)k
(
m+ m+1
2
)
= (1− p1)km+ m+12 k = Cmax + 13
(
2mCmax
m+1
)
= 5Cmax
3
− 2Cmax
m+1
> v.
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• (non-uniform CASH) Suppose that the authentication server, knowing that vˆ = v = 5·Cmax2 , sets
m = 5, k = Cmax/2 and sets p˜1 = 9/16, p˜2 = p˜3 = p˜4 = 1/8 and p˜5 = 1/16.
11 In this case it is
possible to verify that the adversary’s optimal response is to set B∗ = 2 meaning that the adversary
will try guessing the two most likely pairs (pwd1, t = 1) and (pwd2, t = 1) before giving up. Thus,
PCASHADV,v,vˆ,Cmax =
(
p1 + p2
)
p˜1 =
9
16 < 1.
Admittedly these example are both overly simplistic. However, we will later consider several empirical
password distributions and demonstrate that non-uniform CASH distributions are often significantly better
than both uniform CASH and deterministic key-stretching.
4 Stackelberg Model
In the last section we observed that uniform CASH can reduce the adversary’s success rate compared to
deterministic key-stretching techniques with comparable costs. We also saw that sometimes it is possible to
do even better than uniform CASH by selecting a non-uniform distribution over t.12 This observation leads
us to ask the following question: What distribution over t leads to the optimal security results?
In this section we first formalize the problem of finding the optimal CASH distribution parameters p˜1 ≥
. . . ≥ p˜m ≥ 0. Intuitively, we can view this problem as the problem of computing the Stackelberg equilibria
of a certain game between the authentication server and an untargeted offline adversary. Stackelberg games
and their applications have been an active area of research in the last decade (e.g., [15,29,40,59]). For now
we will simply focus on formulating this goal as an optimization problem. In later sections we will present a
polynomial time algorithm to good solutions to this optimization problem (Sections 5 and 5.2) and we will
evaluate this algorithm on empirical password datasets (Section 6).
Before the Stackelberg game begins the adversary is given a value v for cracked passwords and the
authentication server is given an honest estimate vˆ = v of the adversary’s value.13 The authentication server
is also given a bound Cmax on the expected cost of an authentication round.
Defender Action The authentication server (leader) moves first in our Stackelberg game. The authen-
tication server must commit to a CASH distribution p˜ and a hash cost parameter k. The values must be
selected subject to a constraint on the maximum amortized cost for the authentication server
CSRV,α = (1− α)m · k + α · k
m∑
i=1
(i · p˜i) ≤ Cmax .
Intuitively, we can view the value α as being given by nature and the parameter Cmax is given by the
computational resources of the authentication server.
Offline Adversary After the authentication server commits to p˜ and k the offline adversary is given access
to all of the hashed passwords stored on the authentication server. The adversary can try guesses of the form
(pwdi, j). This particular guess is correct if and only if the user u selected password pwdu = pwdi and we
selected the secret salt value tu = j. For an untargeted attacker the probability that this guess is correct is
pi · p˜j . We can describe the action of a rational adversary using a threshold B which denotes the maximum
number of pairs (pwd, t) that he will check (equivalently the maximum number of times he will compute
Hk). Intuitively, we don’t need to specify which pairs the adversary guesses because a rational adversary
will always check the B most likely pairs.
11It is easy to verify that CSRV,α = 2k = Cmax.
12Of course in some cases the uniform distribution might still be optimal.
13In the game the authentication server will assume that vˆ is indeed the correct value when he computes the distribution p˜.
Of course, in our empirical analysis we will also be interested in exploring how CASH performs when this estimate is incorrect
vˆ 6= v.
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We remark that we assume that an offline attacker will be able to obtain the CASH parameters p˜1, . . . , p˜m
and k that we select.14 The adversary also knows the empirical password distribution p1 ≥ . . . ≥ pn and the
associated passwords pwd1, . . . , pwdn.
Optimization Goal Informally, the defender’s goal is to minimize the probability that the rational adver-
sary succeeds in cracking each user’s password. The distribution that achieves this goal is the Stackelberg
equilibrium of our game. Formally, our optimization goal is presented as Optimization Goal 1. We are given
as input the empirical password distribution p1, . . . , pn as well as the value vˆ for the adversary, a maximum
cost Cmax for the authentication server, the CASH parameter m and the fraction α of authentication ses-
sions in which enter their correct password. We want to find values p˜1, . . . , p˜m and k that minimize the
fraction of cracked passwords PCASHADV,v,vˆ,Cmax subject to several constraints. Constraints 1 and 2 ensure that
p˜1, . . . , p˜m form a valid probability distribution, and constraint 3 ensures that the amortized cost of authen-
tication is at most Cmax. Constraint 4 simply defines the variables pi1, . . . , pimn where pii is the probability
of the i’th most likely tuple (pwd, t). Constraints 5 implies that B∗ is the adversary’s optimal response
(e.g., UCASHADV (B
∗, v) ≥ UCASHADV (B, v) for any other threshold B that the adversary might choose). Finally,∑B∗
i=1 pii, our minimization goal, is the fraction of passwords cracked under the adversary’s utility optimizing
response B∗.
Optimization Goal 1: Minimize Adversary Success Rate
Input Parameters: p1, . . . , pn, vˆ, Cmax, m and α.
Variables: p˜1, . . . , p˜m, pi1, . . . , pinm, k
minimize
∑B∗
i=1 pii subject to
(1) 1 ≥ p˜1 ≥ . . . ≥ p˜m ≥ 0,
(2)
∑m
i=1 p˜i = 1,
(3) (1− α)mk + αk∑mi=1 (i · p˜i) ≤ Cmax,
(4) pi1, . . . , pimn = Sort (p1 · p˜1, . . . , pn · p˜m), and
(5) ∀B ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,mn} we have
UCASHADV (B
∗, v) ≥ UCASHADV (B, v) .
Unfortunately, Optimization Goal 1 is inherently non-convex due to the combination of constraints 4 and
5.15 Thus, it is not clear whether or not there is a polynomial time algorithm to compute the Stackelberg
equilibria. However, as we will see in the next section, there is a polynomial time algorithm to solve a very
closely related goal. Minimize the number of passwords that a threshold B adversary can crack (Goal 2).
5 Algorithms
In this section we show how the goal of minimizing the success rate of a threshold B adversary can be
formulated as a linear program with exponentially many constraints (Optimization Goal 2). We also show
that this linear program can be solved in polynomial time by developing an efficient separation oracle.
Unfortunately, this polynomial time algorithm is not efficient enough to solve the large real-world instances
we consider in our experiments in Section 6. However, building on ideas from Section 5, we develop a more
efficient (in practice) algorithm in Section 5.2. This new algorithm always finds an approximately optimal
solution to Optimization Goal 2. While we do not have any theoretical guarantees about its running time, we
14An offline adversary has already breached authentication server which will contain code to sample tu whenever a new user
u creates an account.
15Substituting in the formula for UCASHADV (B, v) constraint 5 becomes v
∑B
i=1 pii−k
∑B
i=1 i·pii−k
∑mn
i=B+1B·pii ≤ v
∑B
i=1 pii−
k
∑B∗
i=1 i · pii − k
∑mn
i=B∗+1B
∗ · pii, where pii depends on the Sort operation.
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found that it converged quickly on every instance we tried. Furthermore, as we will see in our experimental
evaluation, the algorithm results in significantly improved Stackelberg strategies.
We remark that our experimental results in Section 6 can be understood without reading this section.
In particular, it is possible to view the algorithms in Sections 5 and 5.2, as a blackbox heuristic algorithm
that finds reasonably good solutions to Optimization Goal 1. A more empirically inclined reader may wish
to skip to our experimental results in Section 6 after skimming through this section.
5.1 LP Formulation
We first show how to state our goal, minimize the number of passwords that a threshold B adversary will
crack, as a linear program. Our LP uses the following variables PAdv,B , p˜1, . . . , p˜m. Intuitively, the variable
PAdv,B represents the fraction of passwords that a threshold B adversary can crack. At a high level our
Linear Program can be understood as follows: minimize PAdv,B subject to the requirement that no feasible
strategy for the threshold B adversary achieves a success rate greater than PAdv,B . This requirement can
be expressed as a combination of exponentially many linear constraints. Formally, our LP is presented as
Optimization Goal 2.
Optimization Goal 2: Minimize Threshold B Adversary Success Rate
Input Parameters: p1, . . . , pn, B, Cmax, m, k, α
Variables: p˜1, . . . , p˜m,PAdv,B
minimize PAdv,B subject to
(1) 1 ≥ p˜1 ≥ . . . ≥ p˜m ≥ 0,
(2)
∑m
i=1 p˜i = 1,
(3) (1− α)mk + αk∑mi=1 (i · p˜i) ≤ Cmax,
(4) 0 ≤ PAdv,B ≤ 1, and
(5) ∀S ⊂ P × {1, . . . ,m} s.t |S| = B we have
PAdv,B ≥
∑
(i,j)∈S
pi · p˜j .
The key intuition is that all of the (5) constraints ensure that PAdv,B is at least at big as the best success
rate for a threshold B adversary. This is true because the optimal guessing strategy for a threshold B
adversary is to guess the B most likely tuples (pwd, t). Let S′ denote these B most-likely tuples then one of
the type (5) constraints says that PAdv,B ≥
∑
(i,j)∈S′ pi · p˜j . Thus, type (5) constraints guarantee we cannot
‘cheat’ by pretending like the adversary will follow a suboptimal strategy (e.g., spending his guessing budget
on the least likely passwords) when we solve Optimization Goal 2.
The key challenge in solving Optimization Goal 2 is that there are exponentially many type (5) constraints.
Our main result in this section states that we can still solve this problem in polynomial time.
Theorem 1. We can find the solutions to Optimization Goal 2 in polynomial time in m, n and L, where L
is the bit precision of our inputs.
The proof of Theorem 1 can be found in the appendix. We briefly overview the proof strategy here. The
key idea is to build a polynomial time separation oracle for Optimization Goal 2. Given a candidate solution
p˜ the separation oracle should either tell us that the solution is feasible (satisfies all type (5) constraints)
or it should find an unsatisfied constraint. We can then use the ellipsoid method [44] with our separation
oracle to solve to solve the linear program in polynomial time. In appendix .1 we show how to develop a
polynomial time separation oracle for our linear programs. Intuitively, the separation oracle simply sorts the
tuples P × {1, . . . ,m} using the associated probabilities Pr[(pwdi, t)] = pi · p˜t. Then we can find the set S′
of the B most likely tuples and check to see if the constraint PAdv,B ≥
∑
(i,j)∈S′ pi · p˜j is satisfied.
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Once we have a polynomial time algorithm to solve Optimization Goal 2 for a fixed value of k we could
adopt the multiple LP framework of Conitzer and Sandholm [29] to include k as an optimization parameter.
The idea is simple. Because the range of possible values of k is small (k ≤ Cmax) we can simply solve
Optimization Goal 2 separately for each value of k and take the best solution — the one with the smallest
value of PAdv,B .
5.2 Practical CASH Optimization
Theorem 1 states that Optimization Goal 2 can be solved in polynomial time using the ellipsoid algorithm [44].
While this is nice in theory the ellipsoid algorithm is rarely deployed in practice because the running time
tends to be very large. In this section we develop a heuristic algorithm (Algorithm 3) to solve Goal 2 using
our separation oracle. While algorithm 3 is guaranteed to always find the (approximately) optimal solution
to Optimization Goal 2, we do not have any theoretical proof that it will converge to find the optimal solution
in polynomial time. However, in all of our experiments we found that Algorithm 3 converged reasonably
quickly.
The basic idea behind our heuristic algorithm is to start by ignoring all of the type (5) constraints from
Goal 2. We then run a standard LP solver to find the optimal solution to the resulting LP. Finally, we run
our separation oracle to determine if this solution violates any type (5) constraints. If it does not then we
are done. If the separation oracle does find a violated type (5) constraint then we add this constraint to our
LP and solve again. We repeat this process until we have a solution that satisfies all type (5) constraints.
Observe that this process must terminate because we will eventually run out of type (5) constraints to add.
The hope is that our algorithm will converge much more quickly. In practice, we find that it does (e.g., at
most 25 iterations).
Further Optimizations Our separation oracle runs in time O (mn logmn) because we sort a list of mn
tuples (pwd, t). In practice, the number of passwords n might be very large (e.g., the RockYou dataset
contains n ≈ 14.3 × 106 unique passwords). Fortunately, it is often possible to drastically reduce the time
and space requirements of our separation oracle by grouping passwords into equivalence classes. In particular,
we group two passwords pwdi and pwdj into an equivalence class if and only if pi = pj . This approach reduces
running time of our separation oracle to O (mn′ logmn′), where n′ is the number of equivalence classes16. For
example, the RockYou database contains over 107 unique passwords, but we only get n′ = 2040 equivalence
classes.
We can represent our empirical distribution over passwords as a sequence of n′ pairs (p1, n1) , . . . , (pn′ , nn′).
Here, pi denotes the probability of a password in equivalence class i and ni ∈ N denotes the total number
of passwords in equivalence class i. We have
∑n′
i=1 ni = n and
∑n′
i=1 ni · pi = 1. As before we assume that
pi ≥ pi+1. In most password datasets nn′ is the number of passwords that were selected by only one user
(e.g., for the RockYou dataset nn′ ≈ 11.9× 106).
We now argue that this change in view does not fundamentally alter our linear program (Optimization
Goal 2) or our separation oracle. Constraints (1)–(4) in our LP remain unchanged. We need to make a few
notational changes to type (5) constraints to ensure that PAdv,B is at least as large at the success rate of
the optimal adversary. We use
FB =
(b1, . . . , bn′) ∈ Nn′
n′∑
i=1
bi ≤ B ∧ ∀i.bi ≤ m · ni
 ,
to describe the space of feasible guessing strategies for an adversary with a threshold B. Here, bi denotes
the total number of times the adversary evaluates Hk while attacking passwords in equivalence class i ≤ n′.
Thus, the range of bi is 0 ≤ bi ≤ m ·ni because there are ni passwords in the equivalence class to attack and
he can choose to evaluate Hk up to m times for each password.
16To save computation one could also group passwords into equivalence classes with approximately equal probabilities, but
this representation loses some accuracy and was unnecessary in all of our experiments.
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Given values p˜1, . . . , p˜m and a feasible allocation b1, . . . , bn′ ∈ FB the probability that adversary will
crack the password is at most
n′∑
i=1
pi
(bi mod ni) p˜⌈ bi
ni
⌉ +
⌊
bi
ni
⌋∑
j=1
nip˜j
 .
Intuitively, the optimal adversary will spend equal effort (bi/ni) cracking each password in an equivalence
class because they all have the same probability. The (bi mod ni) and bbi/nic terms handle the technicality
that bi may not be divisible by ni. Thus, we can replace our type (5) constraints with the constraint
PAdv,B ≥
n′∑
i=1
pi
(bi mod ni) p˜⌈ bi
ni
⌉ +
⌊
bi
ni
⌋∑
j=1
nip˜j
 ,
for every (b1, . . . , bn′) ∈ FB .
Our modified separation oracle works in essentially the same way. We sort the tuples (i, j) using the
values p′i,j = pi · p˜j and select the B largest tuples. The only difference is that the adversary is now allowed to
select the tuple (i, j) up to ni times. In this section we will use SeparationOracle to refer to the modified
separation oracle, which runs in time O (mn′ logmn′) using our compact representation of the empirical
password distribution.
Our heuristic algorithm (Algorithm 3) takes as input an approximation parameter . It is allowed to
output a solution p˜1, . . . , p˜m,PAdv,B as long as the solution is within  of optimal — for any other feasible
solution p˜′1, . . . , p˜
′
m,P ′Adv,B we have PAdv,B ≤ P ′Adv,B + . We use Slack to denote a function that computes
how badly a linear inequality C is violated. For example, if C denotes the inequality x + y ≥ 2.5 and we
have set x′ = y′ = 1 then Slack (C, x′, y′) = 0.5 (e.g., if we introduced a slack variable z then we would need
to select z′ such that |z′| = 0.5 to satisfy the inequality x′ + y′ + z′ ≥ 2.5).
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Algorithm 3 Optimize (p, n,B,Cmax, α, ,m, S)
Input: p1, . . . , pn′ , n1, . . . , nn′ , B, Cmax, α, , m, S = {k0, k1, . . . , , kτ},
1: bestSolution← ∅, bestK ← k0
2: bestSuccessRate← 1.0, slack ← 
3: for j = 0, . . . , τ do
4: k ← kj
5: C ← InitialConstraints(Cmax, α, k)
{Initially, C only includes constraints (1)–(4)
in goal 2}
6: Goal← {minPAdv,B}
7: V rbls← {PAdv,B , p˜1, . . . , p˜m}
8: P ′Adv,B , p˜′1, . . . , p˜′m ← LPSolve (Goal, V rbls, C)
9: p˜′ ← (p˜′1, . . . , p˜′m)
10: ~p← (p1, . . . , pn′)
11: ~n← (n1, . . . , nn′)
12: Sepin ←
(
~p, ~n, p˜′, B, k, CSRV,α,P ′Adv,B
)
13: C ′ ← SeparationOracle (Sepin)
14: while
∣∣∣Slack(C ′, p˜,P ′Adv,B)∣∣∣ >  ∧ (C ′ 6= “Ok”) do
15: C ← C⋃{C ′}
16: P ′Adv,B , p˜′ ← LPSolve (Goal, V rbls, C)
17: {p˜′ = (p˜′1, . . . , p˜′m)}
18: Sepin ←
(
~p, ~n, p˜′, B, k, CSRV,α,P ′Adv,B
)
19: C ′ ← SeparationOracle (Sepin)
20: end while
21: if bestSuccessRate ≥ P ′Adv,B then
22: bestSolution← p˜1, . . . , p˜m
23: bestSuccessRate← P ′Adv,B
24: (bestM, bestK)← (mi, ki)
25: slack ← Slack
(
C ′, p˜,P ′Adv,B
)
26: end if
27: end for
28: return p˜1, . . . , p˜m, bestK
5.3 Choosing a CASH Distribution
While Algorithm 3 efficiently solves optimization Goal 2, it may not yield the optimal distribution for
our original Stackelberg game. In particular, while Algorithm 3 gives the optimal distribution against a
threshold-B adversary, the rational adversary might choose to use a different threshold B∗ 6= B.
We introduce a heuristic algorithm to find good Stackelberg strategies (CASH distributions) for the
defender. Algorithm 4 uses Algorithm 3 as a subroutine to search for good CASH distributions. Algorithm
4 takes as input an (estimate) vˆ of the adversary’s value and a set B of potential adversary thresholds B
and runs Algorithm 3 to compute the optimal distribution for each threshold. We then compute the rational
value vˆ adversary’s best response to each of distributions and find the best distribution for the authentication
server — the one which results in the lowest fraction of cracked passwords under the corresponding best
adversary response. Algorithm 4 assumes a subroutine RationalAdvSuccess (p, n, vˆ, p˜, k), which computes
the fraction of cracked passwords under a value vˆ adverary’s best response to the CASH distribution p˜ with
empirical password distribution defined by the pair (p, n) and a hash cost parameter k.
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Algorithm 4 FindCASHDistribution
Input: p1, . . . , pn′ , n1, . . . , nn′ , vˆ, Cmax, α, , m, S = {k0, k1, . . . , kτ}, B = {B0, B1, . . . , B`}
1: p˜1, . . . , p˜m ← 1/m
2:
k ← Cmax
(1− α)m+ α (m+12 )
3: advSuccess← PpepperADV,vˆ,Cmax
4: for x = 0, . . . , ` do
5: B ← Bx
6: p˜x, kx ← Optimize (p, n,B,Cmax, α, ,m, S)
7: CS ← RationalAdvSuccess (p, n, vˆ, p˜x, kx)
8: if CS ≤ advSuccess then
9: p˜← p˜x
10: k ← kx
11: advSuccess← CS
12: end if
13: end for
14: return p˜, k
We remark that the subroutine RationalAdvSuccess can be computed in time O
(
n′m logmn′
)
— the
most expensive step is sorting the mn′ pairs (pi, p˜j) based on the value pi · p˜j . Once we have these pairs
in sorted order there is a simple formula for computing the marginal benefit/costs of a larger threshold B.
See Algorithm 7 in the appendix for more details.
We remark that Algorithm 4 is not guaranteed to always find the optimal solution to optimization goal
1. It may be viewed as a heuristic algorithm that generates many promising candidate CASH distributions
and then selects the best distribution among them.
6 Experimental Results
In this section we empirically demonstrate that our CASH mechanism can be used to significantly reduce
the fraction of accounts that an offline adversary could compromise. We implemented Algorithm 4 in C#
using Gurobi as our LP solver, and analyzed CASH using two real-world password distributions p1, . . . , pn.
The first distribution is based on data from the RockYou password breach (32+ million passwords) and the
second is based on password frequency data from Yahoo! users (representing ≈ 70 million passwords). The
later dataset was not the result of a security breach. Instead, Yahoo! gave Bonneau [20] permission to collect
and analyze password frequency data in a carefully controlled environment. Yahoo! recently allowed Blocki
et al. [16] to use a differentially private [34] algorithm to publish this data. Thus, the password frequency
data in this data set has been perturbed slightly. Blocki et al. [16] also showed that with high probability
the L1 error introduced by their algorithm would be minimal.
In each of our experiments we fix the password correctness rate α ∈ {1, 0.95, 0.9} and the maximum
amortized server cost Cmax before using Algorithm 4 to find a CASH parameters p˜1, . . . , p˜m and k subject
to the appropriate constraints on the amortized server costs.
We compare the % of cracked passwords under three different scenarios:
• (Deterministic Key-Stretching) The authentication server selects a hash function Hk with cost param-
eter k = Cmax (achieved through traditional deterministic key-stretching techniques). The rational
value v adversary will crack each password with probability PdetADV,v,k (eq 1).
• (Uniform-CASH) The authentication server uses CASH with the uniform distribution. He sets k
according to eq 4 to ensure that his amortized costs are at most Cmax. A rational value v adversary
will crack each password with probability PpepperADV,v,Cmax .
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• (CASH) Given an estimate vˆ of the adversary’s budget we used Algorithm 4 to optimize the CASH
parameters k and p˜1, . . . , p˜m subject to the constraint that the amortized server cost is at most Cmax
when users enter the wrong password with probability 1−α. We fixed the parameters m = 50,  = 0.02,
and we set B = {5·Cmax×104, Cmax×106, Cmax×107, 1.5·Cmax×107, 2.0·Cmax×107, 2.5·Cmax×107,
2.65 ·Cmax× 107, 2.8 ·Cmax× 107, 3.0 ·Cmax× 107, 5.0 ·Cmax× 107, Cmax× 108}. Thus, Algorithm 4
computes the optimal distribution against a threshold B adversary for each B ∈ B, and selects the best
distribution p˜ against a value vˆ adversary. PCASHADV,vˆ,vˆ,Cmax will denote the fraction of cracked passwords
when the true value is v = vˆ. When the adversary’s true value is v 6= vˆ, PCASHADV,v,vˆ,Cmax will denote the
fraction of cracked passwords.
Our results indicate that an authentication server could significantly reduce the fraction of compro-
mised passwords in an offline attack by adopting our optimal CASH mechanism instead of deterministic
key-stretching or uniform-CASH. These results held robustly for both the RockYou and Yahoo! password
distributions.
6.0.1 Password Datasets
We use two password frequency datasets, RockYou and Yahoo!, to analyze our CASH mechanism. The
RockYou dataset contains passwords from N ≈ 32.6 million RockYou users, and the Yahoo! dataset contains
data from N ≈ 70 million Yahoo! users. We used frequency data from each of these datasets to obtain an
empirical password distribution p1 ≥ p2 ≥ p3 . . . ≥ pn over P.
The RockYou dataset is based on actual user passwords which were leaked during the infamous RockYou
security breach (RockYou had been storing these passwords in the clear). The total number of unique
passwords in the dataset was n ≈ 14.3 million. Approximately, 11.9 million of these passwords were unique
to one RockYou user. The other ≈ 2.5 million passwords were used by multiple users. The most popular
password (pwd1 = ‘123456’) was shared by ≈ 0.3 million RockYou users (p1 ≈ 0.01). RockYou did not
impose strict password restrictions on its users (e.g. users were allowed to select passwords consisting of only
lowercase letters or only numbers).
We also used (perturbed) password frequency data from a dataset of N ≈ 70 million Yahoo! passwords.
See [20] for more details about how this data was collected and see [16] for more details about how the
frequency data was perturbed to satisfy the rigorous notion of differentially privacy [34]. Blocki et al. [16]
proved that with high probability the L1 distortion of the perturbed frequency data is bounded byO
(√
N/
)
,
where the privacy parameter was set to  = 0.25 when the Yahoo! dataset was published. Thus, the perturbed
dataset will also still give us a good estimate of the empirical password distribution.
6.1 Results
Our first set of experimental results are shown in Figures 1 and 2. These plots were computed under the
assumption that α = 1 (users always enter their passwords correctly), and that vˆ = v (the defender knows
the exact adversary value). The results show that for some (higher) adversary values our non-uniform
CASH distributions improves significantly on the cost-equivalent versions of uniform CASH (50% reduction
in cracked passwords) and deterministic key-stretching (56% reduction in cracked passwords).17 Figures 4a
and 4b (resp. Figures 3a and 3d) show the same results under the assumptions that α = 0.9 (resp. α = 0.95).
Figures 3b and 3c (resp. Figures 3f and 3e) explore the effect of a wrong estimate vˆ 6= v of the adversary’s
value for both the RockYou and Yahoo! datasets. Despite receiving the wrong estimate vˆ our algorithm
returns a distribution that is (almost always) slightly better than the corresponding uniform CASH dis-
tribution. Both distributions still significantly outperform the cost equivalent deterministic key-stretching
solution.
Figures 5 and 6 in the appendix explore what happens when the defender uses the wrong empirical
password distribution when searching for a good CASH distribution p˜ (e.g., if the defender optimizes p˜
17We note that we would expect to see relatively high adversary values v/Cmax in the offline setting because Cmax will
typically be quite small (e.g., $10−6).
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Figure 1: Yahoo Dataset: α = 1.
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Figure 2: RockYou Dataset: α = 1.
under the assumption that the empirical password distribution is given by the Yahoo! dataset when the
actual distribution is given by the RockYou dataset). Briefly, these plots show that non-uniform CASH
significantly outperforms deterministic key-stretching even when non-uniform CASH is optimized under the
wrong distribution and non-uniform CASH slightly outperforms uniform CASH on most, but not all, of the
curve.
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(b) Yahoo: vˆ 6= v
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(c) Yahoo: vˆ 6= v
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(e) RockYou: vˆ 6= v
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(f) RockYou: vˆ 6= v.
Figure 3: α = 0.95
6.2 Discussion
In our experiments we varied the password correctness rate α ∈ {0.9, 0.95, 1}. Intuitively, we expect for CASH
to have a greater advantage over traditional key-stretching techniques when α is larger, but when α → 0
we should not expect for CASH or uniform-CASH to outperform deterministic key-stretching techniques
because there is no advantage in making authentication costs asymmetric. It is easier for users to remember
passwords that they use frequently [17, 22, 52] so we would expect for α to be larger for services that are
used frequently (e.g., e-mail). This suggests that larger values of α (e.g., α = 0.9 or α = 0.95) would be
appropriate for many services because the users who authenticate most frequently would be the least likely
to enter incorrect passwords. While different authentication servers might experience different failed login
rates 1 − α, we remark that it is reasonable to assume that the authentication server knows the value of α
because it can monitor login attempts.
Estimating v While our results suggest that CASH continues to perform well even if our estimate vˆ of
the adversary’s value v for cracked passwords is wrong, we would still recommend that an authentication
server perform a careful economic analysis to obtain the estimate vˆ before running Algorithm 4 to compute
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Figure 4: α = 0.9.
the CASH distribution p˜. The organization should take into account empirical data on the cost Cost (H)
of computing the underlying hash function as well as the market value of a cracked password. If possible,
we recommend that the organization consider data from black market sales of passwords for similar types
of accounts (e.g., an adversary would likely value a cracked Bank of America password more than a cracked
Twitter password). Symantec reports that cracked passwords are sold on the black market for $4–$30 [36].
Thus, $30/Cost (H) might be a reasonable upper bound on the adversary’s value for a cracked password
(measured in # of computations of Hk). We would also strongly advocate for the use of memory hard
functions instead of hash iteration to increase Cost (H) effectively (see discussion in Section 2.2).
Obtaining an Empirical Password Distribution We remark that the specific CASH distributions
we computed for the RockYou and Yahoo! datasets might not be optimal in other application settings
because the underlying password distribution may vary across different contexts. For example, users might
be more motivated to pick strong passwords for higher value accounts (e.g., bank accounts). Similarly,
some organizations choose to restrict the passwords that a user may select (e.g., requiring upper and lower
case letters). While these restrictions do not always result in stronger passwords [45], they can alter the
underlying password distribution [18]. While the underlying distribution may vary from context to context,
we note that an authentication server could always follow the framework of Bonneau [20] and Blocki et
al. [16] to securely approximate the password distribution p1, . . . , pn of its own users.
If an organization remains highly uncertain about value v of a cracked password or about the empirical
password distribution p1, . . . , pn then it may be prudent to adopt the uniform-CASH mechanism (e.g., [46]),
which always performs at least as well as the traditional key-stretching approach.
6.2.1 Experimental Limitations
We remark that values of PCASHADV,v,vˆ,C that we compute in our experiments may be less realistic for larger
values of vCSRV,α (e.g., 10
8). The reason is that pi, our empirical estimate of the probability of password
pwdi, will be too high for many of our unique passwords in the dataset. For example, consider a dedicated
user who memorizes a truly random 20 character string of upper and lower case letters. The true probability
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that any individual password guess matches the user’s password would be at most 1/5220 ≈ 1/ (2.09× 1034).
However, if that password occurred in the RockYou dataset then our empirical estimate of this probability
would be at least 1/
(
3.26× 107). Developing improved techniques for estimating the true likelihood of
unique password in a password frequency dataset is an important research direction.
7 Related Work
Breaches. Recent breaches [2–8] highlight the importance of proper password storage. In one of these
instances [2] passwords were stored on the authentication server in cleartext and in other instances the pass-
words were not salted [5]. Salting is a simple, yet effective, way to defend against rainbow table attacks [9],
which can be used to dramatically reduce the cost of an offline attack against unsalted passwords [49].
Bonneau and Preibusch [21] found that implementation errors like these are unfortunately commonplace.
Key Stretching. The practice of key stretching was proposed as early as 1979 by Morris and Thompson [48].
The goal is to make the hash function more expensive to evaluate so that an offline attack is more expensive
for the adversary. PBKDF2 [43], BCRYPT [54] use hash iteration to accomplish this goal. The recent Ashley
Madison breach highlights the benefits of key-stretching in practice. Through an implementation mistake
half of the Ashley Madison passwords were protected with the MD5 hash function instead of the much
stronger BCRYPT hash function allowing offline password crackers to quickly recover these passwords18.
More modern password hash functions like SCRYPT [51] use memory hard functions for key-stretching.
Recently, the Password Hashing Competition [1] was developed to encourage the development of alternative
password hashing schemes (e.g., [10, 35]). Argon2 [12], the winner, has a parameters which control memory
usage and parallelism. Deterministic key-stretching methods result in proportionally increased costs for
the legitimate server as well as the adversary. Manber [46] proposed the use of hidden salt values (e.g.,
‘pepper’) to make it more expensive to reject incorrect passwords. CASH may be viewed as a generalization
of this idea. Boyen [23] proposed using halting puzzles to introduce an extreme asymmetry — the password
verification algorithm never halts when we try an incorrect password. However, in practice an authentication
server will need to upper bound the maximum running time for authentication because even legitimate users
may occasionally enter the wrong password.
Other Defenses Against Offline Attacks. If an organization has multiple servers for authentication then
it is possible to distribute storage of the passwords across multiple servers to keep them safe from an adver-
sary who only breaches one server (e.g., see [25] or [27]). Juels and Rivest [42] proposed storing the hashes of
fake passwords (honeywords) and using a second auxiliary server to detect an offline attack (authentication
attempt with honeywords). Another line of research has sought to include the solution(s) to hard artificial
intelligence problems in the password hash so that an offline attacker needs human assistance [13, 28, 30].
By contrast, CASH does not require an organization to purchase and maintain multiple (distributed) au-
thentication servers and it could be adopted without altering the user’s authentication experience (e.g., by
requiring the user to solve CAPTCHAs).
Measuring Password Strength. Guessing-entropy [47,57],
∑n
i=1 i× pi, measures the average number of
guesses needed to crack a single password. We use a similar formula to compute how much work a threshold-
B adversary would do in expectation. Guessing-entropy and Shannon-entropy are known to be poor metrics
for measuring password strength19 While minimum entropy, H∞ = − log p1, can be used to estimate the
fraction of passwords that could be cracked in an online attack [18], it can provide an overly pessimistic
security measurement in general.
Boztas [24] proposed a metric called β-guesswork, which measured the success rate for an adversary with
β guesses per account
∑β
i=1 pi. We use a similar formula for computing the success rate of a threshold-B
adversary against our CASH mechanism — the key difference is that the adversary must guess the random
value tu as well as the user’s password pwdu. Pliam’s proposed a similar metric called α-guesswork [53],
18See, http://arstechnica.com/security/2015/09/once-seen-as-bulletproof-11-million-ashley-madison-passwords-already-cracked/
(retrieved 5/4/2016)
19Guessing-entropy could be high even if half of our users choose the same password (p1 = 0.5) as long as the other half of
our users choose a password uniformly at random from P
(
p2 = . . . = pn =
2
n−1
)
.
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which measures the number of password guesses the adversary would need (per user) to achieve success rate
α.
Encouraging Users to Memorize Stronger Passwords. A separate line of research has focused on
helping users memorize stronger passwords using various mnemonic techniques and/or rehearsal techniques
(e.g., [14, 22,39,58]).
Password managers seek to minimize user burden by using a single password to generate multiple pass-
words [55]. These password managers often use client-side key stretching to derive each password. While
CASH is a useful tool for server-side key stretching, our current version of CASH is not appropriate for
client-side key stretching because the authentication procedure is not deterministic. In subsequent work,
Blocki and Sridhar [19] developed Client-CASH an extension of CASH suitable for client-side key stretching.
Password Alternatives. Another line of research has focused on developing alternatives to text passwords
like graphical passwords [11, 26, 41]. Herley and van Oorschoot argued that text passwords will remain the
dominant means of authentication despite attempts to replace them [38]. We note that CASH could be
used to protect graphical passwords as well as text passwords.
8 Conclusions
We presented a novel Stackelberg game model which captures the essential elements of the interaction
between an authentication server (leader) and an offline password cracker (follower). Our Stackelberg model
can provide guidance for the authentication server by providing an estimate of how significantly key-stretching
reduces the number of passwords that would be cracked by a rational offline adversary in the event of a server
breach. We also introduced, CASH, a randomized secure hashing algorithm that significantly outperforms
traditional key-stretching defenses in our Stackelberg game. While the problem of computing an exact
Stackelberg equlibria is non-convex, we were able to find an efficient heuristic algorithm to compute good
strategies for the authentication server. Our heuristic algorithm is based on a highly related problem that
we are able to show is tractable. Finally, we analyzed the performance of our CASH mechanism using
empirical password data from two large scale password frequency datasets: Yahoo! and RockYou. Our
empirical analysis demonstrates that the CASH mechanism can significantly (e.g., 50%) reduce the fraction
of passwords that would be cracked in an offline attack by a rational adversary. Thus, our CASH mechanism
can be used to mitigate the threat of offline attacks without increasing computation costs for a legitimate
authentication server.
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Missing Proofs
Reminder of Theorem 1. We can find the solutions to Optimization Goal 2 in polynomial time in m, n
and L, where L is the bit precision of our inputs.
Proof of Theorem 1. (sketch) We first note that the convex feasible space from Optimization Goal 2 fits
inside a ball of radius one. Thus, the Ellipsoid algorithm [44] will converge after making poly(m) many
queries to our separation oracle. By Theorem 2 the running time of the separation oracle is O (mn logmn).
Thus, the total running time is polynomial in m and n. 
.1 Separation Oracle
The key idea behind Theorem 1 is to develop a polynomial time separation oracle. A separation oracle is an
algorithm that takes as input a convex set K ⊆ Rm and a point p ∈ Rm. The separation oracle outputs “Ok”
if p ∈ K; otherwise it returns hyperplane separating x from K. In our context, the separation oracle takes as
input a proposed solution P ′Adv,B , p˜′1, . . . , p˜′m and outputs “Ok” if every constraint from Optimization Goal
2 is satisfied; otherwise the separation oracle finds a constraint that is not satisfied. If we can develop a
polynomial time separation oracle for our linear program then we can use the ellipsoid algorithm to solve
our linear program in polynomial time [44]. For our purposes, it is not necessary to understand how the
ellipsoid algorithm works. Will we treat the ellipsoid algorithm as a blackbox that can solve a linear program
in polynomial time given oracle access to a separation oracle.
We now present a separation oracle for Goal 2. Theorem 2 states that Algorithm 5 is a polynomial time
separation oracle. We provide intuition for our separation oracle below. Theorem 1 follows immediately
because we can run the ellipsoid algorithm [44] with our separation oracle to solve Goal 2 in polynomial
time.
Theorem 2. Algorithm 5 is valid separation oracle for Goal 2 and runs in time O (mn logmn).
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Algorithm 5 Separation Oracle. Output is an unsatisfied constraint C or “Ok” if every constraint is
satisfied.
Input: p1, . . . , pn, p˜
′
1, . . . , p˜
′
m, B, Cmax, k, α, and and P ′Adv,B .
1: if
∑m
i=1 p˜
′
i 6= 1 then
2: return
∑m
i=1 p˜i = 1.
3: end if
4: if (1− α)m · k + k · α∑mi=1 i · p˜′i > Cmax then
5: return (1− α)m · k + k · α∑mi=1 i · p˜′i ≤ Cmax
6: end if
7: for i=1,. . . ,m do
8: if p˜′i < 0 then
9: return p˜i ≥ 0.
10: end if
11: if i < m and p˜′i+1 > p˜
′
i then
12: return p˜i+1 ≤ p˜i.
13: end if
14: end for
15: if P ′Adv,B > 1 then
16: return P ′Adv,B ≤ 1
17: end if
18: if P ′Adv,B < 0 then
19: return P ′Adv,B ≥ 0
20: end if
21: for i = 1,. . . , n do
22: for j = 1,. . . , m do
23: p′i,j ← pip˜′j .
24: end for
25: end for
26: TUPLES ← {(i, j) 1 ≤ i ≤ n ∧ 1 ≤ j ≤ m}.
27: Define ordering  over TUPLES: (i1, j1)  (i2, j2) if any of the following conditions hold (1) pi1,j1 >
pi2,j2 , or (2) pi1,j1 = pi2,j2 and i1 < i2 or (3)pi1,j1 = pi2,j2 and i1 = i2 and j1 < j2.
28: SORTED − TUPLES ← SORT (TUPLES,). {Let Tk .= SORTED − TUPLES[k]. }
{Tk is the k’th biggest element according to }
29: S ← {T1, . . . , TB}.
30: for i=1,. . . ,n do
31: b′i ← max {j ∈ Z j = 0 ∨ (i, j) ∈ S}
32: end for
33: if P ′Adv,B <
∑n
i=1 pi
∑b′i
j=1 p˜
′
j then
34: return PAdv,B ≥
∑n
i=1 pi
∑b′i
j=1 p˜j
35: else
36: return “Ok”
37: end if
Intuitively, the idea behind the separation oracle is quite simple. Suppose that we want to verify that
the variable assignment p˜′1, . . . , p˜
′
m,P ′Adv,B is feasible. The first few steps of our separation oracle verify that
constraints (1)–(4) from Goal 2 are satisfied by the assignment p˜′1, . . . , p˜
′
m. These straightforward checks
simply verify that the proposed CASH distribution p˜′1, . . . , p˜
′
m is valid and that the server’s amortized costs
are less than CSRV,α.
The next step, verifying that all type (5) constraints are satisfied, is a bit more challenging because there
are exponentially many constraints. Recall that these constraints intuitively ensure that P ′Adv,B is indeed
an upper bound on the success rate of the optimal adversary given CASH distribution p˜′1, . . . , p˜
′
m. While
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we don’t have time to check every feasible budget allocation ~b ∈ FB for the adversary, it suffices to find the
adversary’s optimal budget allocation ~b′ and verify that P ′Adv,B is an upper bound on the adversary’s success
rate given allocation ~b′.
The adversary gets bB/kc total guesses of the form (pwi, j) for each user u. The probability that the guess
(pwi, j) is correct is simply p
′
i,j
.
= pi · p˜′j — the guess is correct if and only if u selected password pwdu = pwdi
and we selected CASH running time parameter tu = j. The adversary’s optimal strategy is simple: try the
bB/kc most likely guesses. Thus, we can quickly find the adversary’s optimal budget allocation ~b′ by
computing pi,j for each pair (pwi, j) and sorting these values. This takes time O (nm log nm).
Reminder of Theorem 2. Algorithm 5 is valid separation oracle for Goal 2 and runs in time O (mn logmn).
Proof of Theorem 2. (Sketch) The most expensive step in our algorithm is sorting the p′i,j values. There
are mn such values so the algorithm takes O (mn logmn) steps. We now argue that our separation oracle
has correct behavior.
Suppose first that there is a constraint C from Optimization Goal 2 that is not satisfied by p˜′1, . . . , p˜
′
m,P ′ADV,B .
It is easy to verify that our separation oracle will catch violations of constraints (1)–(4) so we can assume
that C be a violated type (5) constraint P ′ADV,B <
∑n
i=1 pi
∑bCi
j=1 p˜j where
(
bC1 , . . . , b
C
n
) ∈ FB . Let b′1, . . . , b′n
denote the budget obtained by sorting the pi,j values and then greedily selecting a set S
′ of the largest values
until the budget expires — we define b′i to be the number of values of the form pi,j that are selected and
S′ = {(i, j) i ≤ n ∧ j ≤ b′i} It suffices to argue that
n∑
i=1
pi
b′i∑
j=1
p˜j ≥
n∑
i=1
pi
bCi∑
j=1
p˜j
because in this case our algorithm will return the violated constraint
P ′ADV,B ≥
n∑
i=1
pi
b′i∑
j=1
p˜j .
Let SC = {(i, j) i ≤ n ∧ j ≤ bCi }. We first observe that∑
(i,j)∈S′
p′i,j ≥
∑
(i,j)∈SC
p′i,j ,
by construction of S′. Thus,
n∑
i=1
pi
b′i∑
j=1
p˜′j =
∑
(i,j)∈S′
p′i,j
≥
∑
(i,j)∈SC
=
n∑
i=1
pi
bCi∑
j=1
p˜′j
Finally, when the solution p˜′1, . . . , p˜
′
m,P ′ADV,B does satisfy all constraints from Optimization Goal 2 our
algorithm will not find a constraint b′1, . . . , b
′
n such that
P ′ADV,B <
n∑
i=1
pi
b′i∑
j=1
p˜j .
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In this case our algorithm will return “Ok” — the desired outcome. 
Algorithm 6 InitialConstraints (Cmax, α, k)
Input: Cmax, α, k
1: C ← C⋃{∑mi=1 p˜i = 1}.
2: C ← C⋃{1 ≥ p˜m ≥ 0}.
3: C ← C⋃{(1− α)m · k + α · k∑mi=1 i · p˜i ≤ CSRV,α}.
4: for i=1,. . . ,m-1 do
5: C ← C⋃{1 ≥ p˜i ≥ 0}.
6: C ← C⋃{p˜i ≥ p˜i+1}.
7: end for
8: C ← C⋃{1 ≥ PAdv,B ≥ 0}.
Algorithm 7 RationalAdvSuccess (p, n, vˆ, p˜, k)
Input: p1, . . . , pn′ , n1, . . . , nn′ , vˆ, p˜
1: curSuccess← 0
2: curThreshold← 0
3: curUtility ← 0
4: bestUtilityFound← 0
5: bestUtilitySuccess← 0
6: T ← ∅
7: for i = 1, . . . , n′ do
8: for j = 1, . . . ,m do
9: T.Add (pi · p˜j , ni)
10: end for
11: end for
12: Sort (T ). {Use first component pi · p˜j for}
13: { comparison (greatest to least)}
14: for t ∈ T do
15: (pi, count)← t
16: curThreshold← curThreshold+ count
17: curSuccess← pi · count
18: ∆benefit← vˆ · pi · count
19: ∆cost← k ∗
(
count ∗ (1− curSuccess) + pi·count2+pi·count2
)
20: curUtility ← curUtility + ∆benefit−∆cost
21: if curUtility > bestUtilityFound then
22: bestUtilityFound← curUtility
23: bestUtilitySuccess← curSuccess
24: end if
25: end for
26: return bestUtilitySuccess
While we do not have a polynomial time algorithm to compute the Stackelberg equilibrium of our game,
it is always easy for the adversary to compute his best response.
Theorem 3. Let p = p1 ≥ . . . ≥ pn′ and n1, . . . , nn′ define a probability distribution over passwords in
which there are ni passwords that each are chosen with probability pi and let p˜1 ≥ . . . ≥ p˜m denote any
CASH distribution. Then for any value vˆ and any hash cost parameter k we can computed the adversary’s
optimal strategy in time O(mn′ logmn′).
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Proof. (sketch) Algorithm 7 computes the adversay’s optimal strategy. The most expensive step is the sorting
the mn tuples, which takes time O(mn′ logmn′). Thus, Algorithm 7 runs in time in time O(mn′ logmn′).
Algorithm 7 iterates through the different possible thresholds that a rational adversary might select. The
variable curUtility keeps track of the utility at each threshold allowing us to remember which threshold was
optimal. Intuitively, Algorithm 7 will find the best strategy if and only if curUtility is always a correct
estimate of the adversary’s utility. Clearly, this is true initially (the utility of selecting B∗ = 0 is 0). Thus,
by induction, it suffices to show that the formulas used to compute marginal cost and marginal benefit are
correct. If the adversary adds all of the tuples (pwd, t) corresponding to (pi, count) to the set of tuples to
guess then the adversary is increasing the odds that he cracks the password by pi · count because he is adding
count tuples to his set of guesses and each tuple is correct with probability pi. Thus, his marginal benefit is
vˆ ·pi · count. To analyze marginal cost we consider three cases: 1) The correct tuple (pwd∗, t∗) was already in
the adversary’s set of tuples to guess. In this case we don’t increase the adversary’s guessing costs because
he will always quit before he guesses one of the new tuples we added. 2) The correct tuple (pwd∗, t∗) is not
already in the adversary’s set of tuples and it is not in the new set of tuples we add. Thus, we increase the
adversary’s guessing costs by k ∗ count. 3) The correct tuple (pwd∗, t∗) is in the new set of tuples we add.
In this case we increase the adversary’s guessing costs by k ∗ ( count+12 ) in expectation. The probability that
we are in case 2 is (1− curSuccess) and the probability that we are in case 3 is pi · count. Thus,
∆cost← k ∗
(
count ∗ (1− curSuccess) + pi · count
2 + pi · count
2
)
.
Extra Plots
Figures 6 and 5 explore what happens when the defender uses the wrong empirical password distribution
when searching for a good CASH distribution p˜ (e.g., if the defender optimizes p˜ under the assumption
that the empirical password distribution is given by the Yahoo! dataset when the actual distribution is
given by the RockYou dataset). Once again non-uniform CASH and CASH both significantly outperform
deterministic key-stretching, an non-uniform CASH outperforms uniform CASH (slightly) over most of the
curve20. Interestingly, in one part of the curve in Figure 6 the adversary’s success rate actually drops as v
increases. This would be impossible if the defender was using the correct empirical password distribution.
In this case the adversary’s success rate drops when v increases because the defender switches to a better
CASH distribution p˜ that happens to perform better under the real distribution.
Figure 7 plots the fraction of cracked passwords against a value v adversary when the defender selects p˜
and k under the assumption that the adversary’s value is vˆ = 2.9×Cmax×107 (using the empirical password
distribution from the Yahoo dataset and setting α = 0.95). Figure 8 plots the corresponding cumulative
cost distribution for the authentication server induced by p˜, k and α. For comparison, we also include the
cumulative cost distributions for uniform CASH and deterministic key-stretching under the same maximum
cost parameter Cmax.
20The exception is Figure 6 contains a region where uniform-CASH actually outperforms non-uniform CASH (yielding 15%
reduction in cracked passwords in comparison to non-uniform CASH).
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Figure 5: RockYou Results (Optimized for Yahoo): α = 0.95.
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Figure 6: Yahoo Results (Optimized for RockYou): α = 0.95.
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